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Will	purpose	ever	replace	shareholder	value
maximisation	as	the	corporate	governance	lodestar?
As	governments	wrestle	with	the	economic	and	public	health	challenge	of	COVID,	attention	is	turning	to	the	part
business	should	play	in	the	recovery	and	aftermath.	Will	companies	funnel	government	bailouts	and	wage
subsidies	into	dividends	and	bonuses?	Or	repay	the	debt	by	committing	to	their	workers	and	communities	and
investing	more	in	developing	the	products	and	services	of	the	future?
These	questions	matter	because	public	discontent	with	business	has	been	rising	in	recent	years	over	scandals	like
BHS	and	Carillion,	together	with	high	executive	pay	often	unjustified	by	performance.	This	has	prompted	a	debate
within	major	companies	about	their	relationship	to	society.
Business	leaders	have	been	actively	exploring	the	merits	of	pursuing	other	objectives	besides	profit	maximisation,
for	example	safeguarding	the	environment	and	the	interests	of	future	generations,	as	well	as	taking	into	account	the
interests	of	a	wider	range	of	‘stakeholders’	besides	owners,	including	their	workers	and	suppliers.
This	is	all	part	of	a	growing	reaction	against	the	Friedmanite	doctrine	of	‘shareholder	value	maximisation’	which	has
dominated	thinking	on	corporate	governance	since	the	1970s.	A	focus	on	generating	returns	for	shareholders	to	the
exclusion	of	other	goals	is	widely	felt	to	have	come	at	the	cost	of	investment	in	skills	and	R&D,	which	is	implicated
in	sub-par	productivity	growth	since	the	financial	crisis.	It	has	also	stoked	fears	that	overly-short-termist	firms
concerned	mainly	with	their	bottom	lines	will	fail	to	invest	what	is	needed	to	power	the	post-COVID	economic
recovery.
A	focal	point	for	the	counter-revolution	has	been	the	British	Academy’s	project	on	‘The	Future	of	the	Corporation’
which	presses	the	point	that	successful	companies	are	often	those	that	internalise	social	goals	by	widening	the
range	of	incentives	facing	managers	beyond	the	narrowly	financial.	They	do	this	by	setting	out	a	corporate
‘purpose’	distinct	from	making	a	profit,	such	as	‘serving	our	customers	and	society	better’,	and	mandating	their
board	to	ensure	managers	pursue	this	goal.
In	theory,	all	companies	can	adopt	a	purpose	not	solely	related	to	shareholder	value	maximisation	and	act	upon	it.
A	growing	number,	under	pressure	from	institutional	investors	who	have	to	sell	their	financial	products	to	an
increasingly	environmentally	and	socially	aware	public,	are	now	doing	so	in	practice.
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Major	companies	such	as	Blackrock,	JP	Morgan	and	BP	have	endorsed	the	purpose	agenda.	Mutual	and	pensions
funds	in	charge	of	some	$30trn	of	assets	now	build	detailed	environmental,	social	and	governance	(ESG)
assessments	into	their	decision-making	and	expect	the	companies	they	invest	in	to	explain	how	they	will	meet
these	goals.
Yet	the	problem	exists	of	how	to	define	‘purpose’	in	a	way	that	clearly	shifts	the	onus	away	from	shareholder	value
maximisation	towards	sustainability	in	all	its	forms.
Critics	of	purposefulness	argue	that	requiring	company	boards	to	embrace	social	concerns	might	salve	their
consciences,	but	it	does	not	change	their	fundamental,	underlying,	incentives	–	which	are	to	generate	a	return	for
their	owners.	Given	this,	simply	declaring	that	executives	are	accountable	to	a	wider	range	of	stakeholders	won’t
necessarily	make	them	behave	better	towards	them,	particularly	if	these	have	divergent	interests	and	unequal
power.
Suspicions	therefore	lurk	that	talk	of	purpose	geared	to	delivering	social	value	may,	in	reality,	be	a	device	to
maximise	shareholder	value	in	a	political	environment	where	social-media	empowered	consumers	can	easily	mount
damaging	campaigns	against	companies	that	impact	their	share	price.
Moreover,	even	if	CEOs	and	their	boards	see	the	benefits	of	incorporating	purpose	into	their	companies’	missions,
it	could	take	years	to	see	a	major	course	correction	–	just	as	it	took	decades	for	shareholder	value	maximisation	to
become	the	default	goal	of	most	public	companies.	An	economy	recovering	from	COVID	does	not	have	decades.
One	area	where	declarations	of	purpose	could	make	a	big	difference	more	incrementally	is	action	on	climate
change.	Eighty	seven	companies,	worth	$2.3	trillion,	signed	up	to	a	UN	campaign	at	the	2019	Climate	Action
Summit	to	keep	global	warming	to	a	maximum	of	1.5	C.	BP	has	announced	a	new	corporate	purpose	around
‘reimagining	energy.’	Microsoft’s	recent	pledge	to	go	carbon	negative	by	2030	is	significant	as	the	US	computer
giant	sits	at	the	head	of	major	global	supply	chains	which	will	now	be	decarbonised.
But	these	actions,	while	welcome,	could	equally	be	viewed	as	defensive	measures	by	companies	that	suddenly	find
themselves	vulnerable	to	new	regulatory	or	consumer	pressures.
Letting	companies	set	and	mark	their	own	homework	opens	the	door	to	purpose-setting	as	a	new	form	of	corporate
window-dressing	to	shore	up	profitability	and	fend	off	state	regulation.	A	survey	by	the	Responsible	Business
Tracker	indicates	a	large	gap	between	the	number	of	companies	saying	they	have	a	purpose	statement	(86%)	and
those	with	a	realistic	plan	for	achieving	it	(17%).
Major	global	firms	with	valuable	brands	to	protect	certainly	have	much	to	gain	reputationally	from	adopting	purpose
and	are,	predictably,	the	sort	of	companies	that	most	readily	sign	up	to	it.	But	what	about	smaller	firms	comprising
the	bulk	of	the	economy	that	aren’t	household	names	and	don’t	face	these	reputational	risks?
Whatever	its	flaws,	the	pursuit	of	profit	maximisation	at	least	offers	clear,	measurable	goals,	albeit	by	leaving	the
social	value	question	to	governments.	Being	a	purpose-led	corporate	citizen,	however,	is	more	difficult	to	define
and,	equally	importantly,	measure.
A	particular	focus	of	the	British	Academy	project	has	therefore	been	on	outlining	a	regulatory	and	accountability
framework	to	provide	transparency	to	consumers	and	citizens	so	they	can	make	informed	judgments	about
purchasing	and	investment	decisions.	If	purpose	is	to	replace	shareholder	value	maximisation	as	the	lodestar	of
business	strategies	then	this	framework	will	be	crucial.
However,	it	is	a	work	in	progress	and	we	are	not	there	yet.	At	this	point	in	time,	therefore,	embrace	of	purpose	by
companies	is	probably	a	necessary,	but	not	sufficient,	condition	for	business	to	take	the	lead	in	building	a
sustainable	and	equitable	recovery.	It	is	clearly	part	of	the	solution	to	urgent	challenges	like	climate	change	and	low
productivity,	but	should	not	be	a	substitute	for	traditional	policy	levers	such	as	taxation	and	robust	regulation.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	appeared	first	on	the	site	of	the	Tony	Blair	Institute	for	Global	Change.
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